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Preface
1 undertook this project in the fall semester of 1989 with the hope o! 
learning more about the era of Presidential Reconstruction. 1 was confused 
about the actions of President Johnson and the ex-Confederate states from 
I ee s surrender in April to the convening of the thirty-ninth Congress in 
December iHi'o. Now, nine months later, I am still somewhat confused, but at 
least I have stepped into the sho s of white Southerners and can begin to 
svmpathize with their situation. I have also learned a great deal about the 
United States of America in 186S.
1 chose Mississippi as a representative of the Southern states because its 
legislature passed the first of the infamous Black Codes. It was also 
considered one of the most severe. In addition, antebellum Mississippi 
produced the most cotton in the Union, which meant two things: One,
Mississippi was the state with the most slaves; and two, Mississippi society 
would probably be affected most by the postwar situation. Mississippi was 
also the home of the President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis. All these 
factors contributed to my decision to study Mississippi during the time o! 
Presidential Reconstruction.
Many people have encouraged and assisted me throughout this endeavor 
I would like to thank the following individuals: Mrs. Mary Spence, the
undergraduate History advisor, for suggesting that I research and write a 
thesis in my senior year; my friends who constantly checked on my progress 
and voiced their support, especially John Heintz, Tom McGrath, and David 
Patrick Marti; and Nicole Mac Laughlin, who not only volunteered to read 
various parts of the manuscript and offered valuable insights, but also helped 
me through the many times when I felt that I would never finish this project
ii
Most of all, I would like to thank Professor Robert W Johannsen, who agreed 
to oversee this endeavor. Professor Johannsen inspired me with his lectures, 
guided me with his wisdom, and offered any assistance that was necessary. 
Thank you, Professor Johannsen, for introducing me to the magic of history.
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Chapter One; The Aftermath of War
As Whitelaw Reid surveyed the former plantation of Jefferson Davis in 
iune of 1865, he witnessed the dramatic and overwhelming consequences 
wrought by the Civil War. Travelling through the defeated Confederacy in 
an attempt to assess the conditions, attitudes, and opportunities for Northern 
investment in the war-torn Southern states, the Northern journalist saw 
recently freed runaway slaves tilling the ground "on their own account," and 
black Union soldiers standing guard. Inside the Confederate president s 
plundered mansion, dedicated Northern schoolteachers reported that the 
sons and daughters of the freedmen were learning as quickly as white 
children. In another reference to the Davis plantation, the Vicksburg 
journal declared:
The very place where days and nights had been spent in devising means tor the 
overthrow of the government and the rivetting firmer the fetters of the skive, 
was taken possession of by that strong, firm government, and men there first 
stood up in the manhood that freedom alone can give.
This serene, optimistic scene, however, was not as utopian as it initially 
appeared. If not for the presence of the Union soldiers, Reid noted, white 
Mississippians living nearby would have beaten the freedmen and destroyed 
the school. In fact, the situation at the Davis plantation, represented the 
virtual antithesis of antebellum Mississippi economy and society.1
* Whiteiaw Reid, After the War: a Southern Tour (Cincinnati, 1866), 280*84; Vicksburg
journal, Aug. 3, 1865, quoted in New York Time*, Aug. 22,1865.
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2in the spring of 1865, Mississippi was a defeated state in every aspect. Not 
only had its citizens lost a four-year conflict to preserve their unique lifestyle, 
but their cities and farms had been destroyed, their labor supply had been 
dissolved, and economic stability had been replaced by poverty and disease. 
As a consequence, bands of thieves were roving the countryside in search of 
plunder. To most Mississippians, the cost of secession had been high indeed 
The physical destruction was phenomenal, and towns and villages along 
lines of communication suffered extensive, and often irreparable, damage. 
When General Shermans Union forces blazed through Mississippi in early 
I8u4, they razed nearly everything from Vicksburg to Meridian. While 
surveying the damage inflicted upon one town, Union officers noticed one 
gentleman trying to get someone to sign an affidavit that a town had actually 
existed before the invasion. In June of 1865, a New York Ti me s  
correspondent described Jackson, Mississippi’s capital city:
Once a beautiful city, it is now a mass of ruins. Piles of brick and mortar cover 
the once famous retreats of wealth and fashion. Numerous columns, shattered 
and charred, have suggested for the name of the place "chimneyville."^
In addition to the destruction of businesses, hotels, and restaurants, 
transportation in Mississippi was at a standstill. Not only were tl railroad 
companies deep in debt, but they had also lost over ninety percent of their 
engines and cars, mostly due to an 1863 raid by Union Brigadier General 
Benjamin J. Grierson, whom Mississippians named the ’’railroad wrecker.
^William C  Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi (Baton Rouge, 1967), 18-1 *9.
By 1865, the only trains operating were controlled by the federal army. The 
lack of transportation nullified opportunities for merchants to revive former 
commercial activities. The editor of the Natchez Democrat sadly admitted, 
With no means to recommence life now, with credit destroyed, and 
defrauded of their old debts, they must stand aside and let Northern men and 
Northern capital come in and do the business of the country ’3
But the two classes in Mississippi most affected by the Civil War were the 
planters and the former slaves. In antebellum days, the planters occupied the 
top echelon of Mississippi society. When their slaves were freed, the planters 
lost not only an efficient labor force, but also valuable collateral for credit A* 
a result, they were forced to pay incredible interest rates on loans, and many 
quickly found themselves in J  bt. In addition, when Union forces had 
invaded Mississippi in 1863, many planters had abandoned their property. 
After the war, they returned to their farms, only to find that the federal 
military had leased their lands to Northerners and freedmen. "Respect for 
the rights of absent property owners has nowhere been a very marked 
characteristic of the movements of the Northern armies," Whitelaw Reid 
observed. Although President Johnson eventually restored most of the 
plantations to their former owners, it was already too late to plant crops in 
1865. In addition, Mississippi’s most fertile fields, located in the Delta basin, 
were untenable in 1865. Because the levees had been neglected and destroyed, 
the Mississippi River had flooded the plains and created a swampy 
wilderness.4
'ibid. IH-N, 22, 33.
■*Roid, After the War, 283; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 20-21, 34.
At the war s end, the freedmen, previously cared for by their former 
masters, lived in abject poverty. Ever since General Grant’s invasion of 
Mississippi in 1862, thousands of slaves had run to the protection of the 
Union lines. As a result, Vicksburg became a haven for the refugees. In 
addition, by 1864, many freedmen had journeyed to Mississippi's biggest cities 
to celebrate their new freedom. Living on scanty government rations, the 
former slaves inhabited makeshift shanty towns, which were infested with 
disease. Commenting on the extremely high death rate which plagued the 
city-dwelling freedmen, Provisional Governor William Sharkey told the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction that the Negro race was 
destined to extinction. ’ Most of the freedmen, however, remained on their 
plantations, and some successfully bargained with their former owners for a 
share of the autumn harvest. According to one Northern observer, there 
were no signs ' in the operations of the negro farmers ... to warrant a doubt as 
to their capacity for supporting themselves and managing their own affairs, 
when once fairly started.” In early 1865, the immediate fruits of emancipation 
proved mixed to Mississippi freedmen. And although the freedmen probably 
suffered the most, according to the New Orleans Times, 'Extreme poverty 
ruleld] in almost every household” in the state.^
Despite the destruction wrought on their state at the hands of the Union 
army, most Mississippians accepted the defeat of the Confederacy without 
protest. As Sharkey later told Congress, in June of 1865, Mississippians
were perfectly reconciled to the condition of things, and very anxious to be 
restored to their former position in the Union. I think that they were sincerely 
and honestly so; that was the current sentiment beyond all doubt at that time.
4
** Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 29-30; Reid, After the War, 285.
Another Union sympathizer wrote that "no good citizen will now seek a 
controversy with his Government under any pretext whatever. Public 
sentiment is in favor of a speedy resumption and restoration of Civil law and 
authority " As former secessionist^ and Confederate leaders returned to their 
homes and resumed their antebellum activities, many Mississippians 
displayed a cautious optimism. The Natchez Weekly Democrat declared:
The gloom of night has been upon the land. But we should remember that 
darkness shows us worlds of light we never saw by day. We should banish all 
repimngs; utter no murmerings |siV|; leave sighs to the imbecile; take things as 
they are; recognize the hand of providence in all things; give our hearts to our 
work, and our shoulders to the wheel, and the watchman will yet be heard to 
erv, All is well! All is well!
Although their entire society had been destroyed by the war, many 
Mississippians displayed "an hones) determination to return to their peaceful 
occupations, and to restore the piosperity that once blessed our state."6
Despite the acceptance of the military defeat, however, most 
Mississippians still exhibited an extreme hatred of Northerners. One visiting 
journalist noted that many hotels would either refuse to accommodate 
"damned Yankees" or charge them exorbitant rates. And in several parts of 
the state, "the life of an avowed Northern radical would hardly be worth a 
straw hat but for the presence of the military."7
'’Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 37-39.
' Reid, After the War, 390-401; Sidney Andrew, "Three Months Among the
Keconstructiomsts," Atlantic Monthly 17 (Feb., 1866), 238-40.
6A similar attitude was expressed toward the recently freed black 
population. Before the Emancipation Proclamation, Southerners had always
boasted of the loyalty of their slaves. Now, many hated the blacks and the✓ - *
societal threats which their freedom imposed. The Meridian Daily Clarion 
noted the common concern of white Mississippians in its issue of June 22, 
IKhS:
I The Frmiman'sl right to vote, his right to hold office, his right to enter our 
homes and hearts, his right to marry (Mir daughters and, in fact, his right to do 
everything that a white man is supposed to have the right to do is demanded 
hv the admirers of amelioration, regeneration and miscegenation
Many planters, reluctant to lose their labor supply, believed that the 
Emancipation Proclamation was unconstitutional and could not be enforced. 
Colonel Samuel Thomas, the assistant commissioner of the Ereedmens 
Bureau for the district of Mississippi, suspected that the planters retained “the 
hope that some change will be* made, by which they will be allowed the work 
of these people free of charge, or that some new form of slavery will be 
substituted for the old, in the reorganization of the State.’ binding a 
substitute for their lost labor supply became the major concern for many 
Mississippians concerned with the economic revival of the state.8
Because one-fourth of Mississippi’s white males had been killed in the 
war, and thousands more had suffered crippling injuries, the prospects of the 
labor force relied more on the Negro population than it had under slavery, 
l ew white Mississippians, however, were hopeful that the freedmen would
s Rcid, After the War, 417; Meridian Daily Clarion, Juno 22, 1865; Harris, Presidential
Keeonstruetion in Mississippi, 40.
/function effectively in a free labor market. Many were convinced that "free 
niggers would never make cotton without a system of peonage."' One 
disgruntled planter wrote, ”1 have but little faith in Negro labour unless our 
slates can make sufficient laws to require the negro to remain at one place and 
labour.’’ Several of the more pessimistic Mississippi planters made a serious, 
albeit futile, attempt to import Chinese coolie labor. Mississippians, however, 
soon realized that their economic fortunes were closely intertwined with the 
labor of the freed men. ^
As the winter of 1865-66 grew near, the labor crisis reached its highest 
point. Disillusioned by the dismal crops of 1865 and the inabilitv or refusal of 
their masters to pay them for the previous year s work, many freedmen 
hesitated to contract with planters for the coming season. Rumors also 
abounded that the federal government planned to distribute forty acres and a 
mule to each freedman at Christmas. If a freedman contracted for the 
following year, he would forfeit his chances for gaining his own land. As the 
new year rapidly approached, the Mississippi press declared that one-haif of 
the available land would lie dormant in 1866. In addition to being short on 
labor, planters feared that the freedmen would revolt if they were not granted 
their own property. Although Christmas passed and no insurrection 
occurred, the numerous rumors and fears sweeping the state profoundly 
affected the actions taken by the soon-to-be-established provisional 
government.10
^Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, Si); Erie loner, Rectm struct ion: ISt'.l 
IS77 (New York, 1988), 198; Reid, After the War, 290-91, 417.
u*llarris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 89*91.
8By the time that Presidential Reconstruction got underway in Mississippi 
in late May of 1865, the New York Times reported, ’the Confederate 
authority is not recognized -th e  Federal Government has not been 
established -  and thus the country is suffering all the grief of an interregnum, 
or more properly, of anarchy.’’ Soon after, when Federal Major General Peter 
|. Osterhaus reached Mississippi, he said, ’’This poverty-stricken and utterly 
subjected people are now only anxious for the restoration of authority of 
whatever description." Responding to the lawlessness overrunning the state, 
Mississippians in the conv.ng months would draw upon their familiar beliefs, 
laws, and customs in an effort to establish order out of uncertainty11
1 {lhid, 35 .
Chapter Two: The Formation of Presidential Reconstruction
President Abraham Lincoln had pondered the restoration of the seceded 
states to the Union long before Lee’s surrender at Appomattox in the spring 
of 1865. In fact, Lincoln had officially initiated the process of reconstruction in 
December 1863, when he issued his Proclamation of Amnesty and 
Reconstruction.’’ Under Lincoln's moderate program, Southern rebels and 
their supporters would receive full Presidential pardons in exchange for 
pledging complete loyalty to the United States Constitution. In addition, the 
forgiven Confederates would regain all their property except former slaves. 
Only high Confederate officials and individuals who had resigned positions 
in the Union to serve the Confederacy were excluded from taking the 
amnesty oath. Individuals who chose to take the oath could participate in 
restoring civil government in their respective state. According to Lincoln, 
when only one-tenth of a state's citizens who had been qualified to vote in 
1860 were granted pardons, they could then call a convention in order to re­
establish a civil government loyal to the United States. Although it 
demanded no specific requirements for a state's re-entry to the Union the 
proclamation added that any state action designed to aid the freedmen would 
’’not be objected to by the national Executive."*
Republican congressmen were infuriated by Lincoln s assumption of 
power over reconstruction and his ambiguous, easy terms for the restoration 1
1 Abraham Lincoln, "Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, December 8, 1863," in 
Robert W. Johannsen, Reconstruction, 1865-7877 (New York, 1970), 24-26. For more information 
on Lincoln's reconstruction plans, see William B. Hesseltinc's Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction 
(Tuscaloosa, Alabama, 1960).
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of the defeated states. In response, in July of 1864 Congress passed the Wadi * 
Davis Bill, which required at least fifty-percent of a states eligible voters to 
take the amnesty oath before a new government could be established 
However, Lincoln greeted the bill with a pocket-veto, thus scoring an early 
victory for the executive branch in the battle over Reconstruction. Lincoln s 
Ten Percent Plan was established in Louisiana, Tennessee, and Arkansas, the 
states already under Union control. Less than a week after Lee's surrender to 
Grant, however, Lincoln was assassinated, and his ultimate reconstruction 
plans were never realized. His successor, Andrew Johnson, continued his 
lorerunner's program, while adding his own, less- forgiving elements, 
lohnson introduced his more stringent plan in two proclamations issued on 
Mav 2M, 1865.
The first proclamation referred to the amnesty oath developed by Lincoln. 
Johnson's version required the Southerners to support ali laws dealing with 
the emancipation of slaves. In addition, ’’all persons who [had] voluntarily 
participated in said rebellion and the estimated value of whose taxable 
property [was) over $20,000” were now excluded from taking the oath.
1 lowever, special applications for pardons could be made directly to the 
President. In the second proclamation of May 29, Johnson appointed a 
provisional governor for North Carolina. The governor was instructed to call 
a convention for the purpose of amending the state constitution and 
restoring North Carolina’s relations with the United States government. 
Delegates to the convention were to be elected by the loyal people of the state 
who had taken the amnesty oath. Johnson also ordered the federal armies 
occupying the state to assist the governor in complying with the 
proclamation. This proclamation became the model for the remaining
II
Southern states not already undergoing Presidential Reconstruction, which 
included Mississippi.2 3
On June 13, 1865, barely a month after the Confederate Governor of 
Mississippi, Charles Clark, had surrendered the state's records to Captain J. 
Wa.ren Miller and a squad of Federal troops, President Johnson appointed 
William L. Sharkey as the states provisional governor. Sharkey was 
considered one of the finest legal minds in the history of the state. Born in 
Tennessee and a veteran of the Battle of New Orleans, he had emigrated to 
Mississippi and served in the state legislature. In addition, Sharkey had been 
chief justice of the state High Court of Errors and Appeals for over twenty 
years. A Whig before the war, Sharkey had expressed Union sympathies, and 
when Mississippi joined the Confederacy in 1861, he retired from political life 
and did not participate in the conflict. The appointment of Sharkey was 
generally accepted by the people in the North.3
The President s proclamation for Mississippi was identical to the one for 
North Carolina, and Sharkey immediately began steps to reorganize the state 
government. On July 1, he issued his first proclamation as the provisional 
governor of Mississippi. For the sake of expediency, the governor restored to 
office the county officials who were active when the state surrendered in May. 
These officers were required to take the amnesty oath to resume their duties, 
and those officials ineligible for pardons were to be replaced. The county 
officials were directed to hold an election for delegates to a constitutional
2 Both of Andrew Johnson's May 29, 1865 proclamations are located in Johannscn, 
Reconstruction, 1865-1877, 27-32.
in3 Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 3; James Garner, Reconstruction 
Mississippi (New York, 1933), 75.
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convention on Monday, August 7 A
In addition to calling a reconstruction convention, Sharkey addressed 
other important issues. Some Mississippians were reluctant to take the 
amnesty oath, because they argued that the Emancipation Proclamation was 
unconstitutional. Although most of these individuals recognized that the 
institution of slavery was dead, they felt that, by signing the oath, they would 
forfeit any hopes of compensation for their former slaves. This complaint 
was especially maintained by loyal slaveholders who had not supported the 
Confederacy. In response, Sharkey urged everyone who was eligible to take 
the oath and "to submit without a murmur." Slavery was a dead issue, the 
governor declared, and only the United States Supreme Court had the power 
to rule on emancipation s constitutionality. By addressing the emancipation 
issue, Sharkey forecast the heated debates that would soon consume the 
convention and the legislature.^
The Mississippi Reconstruction Convention was the first to assemble 
under President Johnson s plan. Both North and South focused their 
attention on the city of Jackson, the site of the convention and the states 
capital. According to the New York Times, Mississippi’s convention was 
extremely important because the stite was the home of Jefferson Davis, 
because it was the second state to secede, and because it produced the most 
cotton, which meant it contained the largest number of slaves.6
Meridian Daily Clarion, June 22, 1865; Journal of the Proceedings and Debates in the 
Constitutional Convention of the State of Mississippi, August, 1865 (Jackson, Mississippi, 
1865), 3-5. Hereafter cited as Convention Journal.
''Convention Journal, 6-7.
^Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi!, 84.
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Mississippi's greatest impact, however, would be in its influence on 
following state conventions. An influential New York paper declared:
If Mississippi moves into her place in the Union with a constitution that will 
meet the approval of the government, we shall be able to dismiss all further 
apprehension concerning the action of any other Southern state.
President Johnson also recognized that the success of his reconstruction 
program depended upon Mississippi. In a letter to Sharkey dated August 13, 
1865, the day after the reconstruction convention convened, Johnson wrote:
I hope that without delay your convention will amend your state constitution 
abolishing slavery and denying to all future legislatures the power to legislate 
that there is property in man; also that they will adopt the amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States abolishing slavery. If you could extend the 
elective franchise to all persons of color who can read the Constitution ... and 
write their names ... and to all persons of color who own real estate valued at 
not less than $250, ... you would ... set an example for the other states to 
follow/
For a variety of reasons, voter turnout was incredibly low for the August 7 
election. Former Whigs, a helpless minority to the Democrats in antebellum 
days, saw the opportunity to dominate the new slate government. Because 
they had opposed secession (and several had avoided the war), most Whigs 
were able to take the oath or receive early Presidential pardons. In the bigger 
counties such as Adams and Warren, which included the cities Natchez and 
Vicksburg, respectively, no Democratic opposition developed to rival the 
Whigs, and voter participation declined more than sixty percent from the
?Ibid, 84; Eric L. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (Chicago, 1%0), 56n.
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I860 election. Despite vigorous campaigning by competing Whig factions in 
Hinds County; in which Jackson was located; voter returns dropped sixty- 
eight percent from 1860. In fact, only the central portion of the state 
experienced no major loss in election returns. Many factors contributed to 
the dismal election returns. Bitter Confederates and former secessionists 
refused to take the oath and recognize the results of the war, and others were 
too concerned with their economic plights to bother with politics. 
Furthermore, twenty-five thousand Mississippi soldiers had died on the 
battlefield. But the main reason, according to one scholar, for the low voter 
turnout was the scarcity of time in which to take the* oath before the election. 
Besides confusion in the administration of the oath and the late arrivals of 
the forms to many counties, Mississippians often had to travel great distances 
to take the oath. Apparently, Whigs, mainly planters who feared confiscation 
of their property and individuals who expressed a history of Union 
sentiments, were more willing than Democrats to face rugged, war-torn 
roads.®
The Whigs, the party associated with Union sympathies and outnumbered 
in the secession convention of 1861 by eighty-four to twenty-five, dominated 
the delegates of 1865, capturing seventy of the ninety-seven seats. 
Professionally, the convention consisted of thirty-five lawyers and thirty- 
eight planters. Only eleven of the members had been born in Mississippi. 
Thirty delegates had served in the state legislature, and seven had been 
delegates to the 1861 convention (six had opposed secession.). Although 
reports vary, between two and thirteen delegates had not been pardoned 
when the convention opened.^
^Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 49.
The question of the abolition of slavery was the most important and most 
discussed issue confronting the reconstruction convention. In the month 
preceding the election, candidates and the press declared their positions on 
the status and constitutionality of emancipation. In Hinds County, 
convention candidates published their answers to the following question:
Whether that Convention shall declare by a direct vote the total and final 
abolition of slavery in the State, and the total extinction of all right to 
property in slaves held by any md all classes of our people whatever, including 
minors, women, insane, those who have and those who have not participated in 
the rebellion, as well as those who have opposed it; and by their action to cut 
off all parties from all recourse, right or claim for indemnity upon the 
Government of the United States for property of which they may be so 
invested.
Although the leading candidates in Hinds County had all been Union Whigs 
before the war, they clashed in their responses to the emancipation 
question.10
The Hinds County candidates formed two distinct factions, which 
generally applied to the rest of the state as well. Influential Whigs such as 
Judges William Yerger and Amos R. Johnston endorsed complete 
cooperation with the President, who demanded that each convention abolish 
slavery and nullify secession. Supporters of this view, called conservatives, 
agreed with Governor Sharkey that demands for compensation for the loss of
^Convention Journal, 283; Winbourne M. Drake, 'The Mississippi Reconstruction Convention 
of 1865,” Journal of Mississippi History 21 (October, 1959), 233; Garner, Reconstruction in 
Mississippi, 84.
1°Chicago Tribune, August 2,1865; Convention Journal, 278-83.
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slaves were dubious, ill-timed, and unwise. Johnston declared, "It we 
obstinately hold on to the dead body of slavery, in any manner . . .  we shall 
thus close and bar the only door left open for the readmission into the 
Union." The conservatives hoped to accept the present conditions imposed 
by the President in order to establish self-rule as quickly as possible, l ull 
compliance, however, was not to be confused with devotion to or sympathy 
for the freed men of the state. These men merely sought the speedy return of 
civil government in order to prevent Negro suffrage, for which the radical 
Republicans in the North were clamoring. In fact, Yerger even refused to rule 
out compensation at some future date, when "an era of good feeling" might 
exist between the North and the South. H
Candidates who opposed an acceptance of the President s conditions for 
restoration became known as Potterites, named for the fiesty Whig lawyer 
George L Potter, another candidate from Hinds County. The Potterites 
contended that Mississippi was a sovereign state that had "never forfeited any 
of its rights" under the Constitution. These men demanded "unconditional 
admission into Congress" and compensation for loyal slaveowners. Potter 
even declared that if Mississippi were denied its seats in Congress, then its 
citizens were exempt from paying federal taxes. These two groups 
foreshadowed the future factions which would clash in the state legislature in 
November.12
The Mississippi press was just as vocal as the candidates on the issue of 
emancipation. Of the seventeen newspapers functioning in the state, only 
the Brandon Republican and the Jackson News supported the opinions of
11 Chicago Tribune, August 2,1865.
] 2lbid.
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the Potterites. The rest favored the total abolition of slavery and ridiculed 
Potter and his followers. For example, the July 20 Jackson Mississippian 
called the Potterites the ' Rip Van Winkle Party,” which had slept through the 
war and awoke "crying most lustily for slavery,” Two days before the opening 
of the convention, the Meridian Daily Clarion echoed that sentiment and 
summed up the view of the conservatives:
We hear of candidates for the convention who talk either of ignoring this 
question (of abolitionl or protecting against emancipation and demanding 
compensation. Such a course, however proper it might be under other 
circumstances, at the present would inevitably result in the prolongation of 
military rule in the South and would very probably lead to the reorganization 
of the states on the basis of Negro suffrage.
The duty of the convention, the editor continued, was to "at once change the 
Constitution to harmonize with this new order of things; declare that slavery 
shall no longer exist in Mississippi, and let it be done in good faith, without 
protest or remonstrance.”1^
The Mississippi Reconstruction Convention convened in Jackson on 
Monday, August 14, 1865. J. S. Verger, elected president of the convention, 
administered the amnesty oath to each delegate, and according to the 
Convention journal, "all the members qualified accordingly ” On the next 
day, the president appointed a committee of fifteen members "to inquire into 
such alternatives and amendments of the Constitution as may be proper and
F** Drake, "The Mississippi Reconstruction Convention," 227-30; Meridian Daily Clarion, 
August 13,1865, quoted in Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 82-83,
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expedient to restore the State of Mississippi to its constitutional relations to 
the Federal Government." These "alternatives and amendments" mainly 
concerned the abolition of slavery. The committee, chaired by James T. 
Harrison of Lowndes County, submitted its report on August 17 and 
recommended the insertion of the following provision into the state 
constitution:
That neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall hereafter exist in this 
State; and the Legislature at its next session, and thereafter as the public 
welfare may require, shall provide by law for the protection of the person and 
property of the freed men of the State, and guard them and the State against 
any evils that may arise from their sudden emancipation.
This provision, entitled Section Two of the committees report, sparked 
heated debates between the conservatives and the Potterites for the next four 
sessions.14
Both factions admitted that slavery was definitely a thing of the past 
However, the Potterites wanted to hold the federal government solely 
responsible for its demise. Immediately following the committee’s report, 
Hugh Barr, a delegate from Lafayette County, proposed to insert the 
following clause preceding Section Two: "Slavery having been abolished in 
this State by the action of the Government of the United States . . . "  Others 
echoed Barr's opinion, claiming that the abolition of slavery by Mississippi 
was an involuntary act demanded by the powers in Washington.^
The Potterites* arguments rested upon the U. S. Constitution. Mississippi l
^CowtwiffoH journal, 10-14, 20-21, 29-30. The qualifications of several delegates have been 
disputed by some scholars.
l *tbU, 44-48.
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was a sovereign state, they argued, and neither the President nor Congress 
had the power to compel a state to pass a law. On Friday, August 18, Potter 
himself criticized Section Two and denounced the federal government lor 
not compensating loyal slaveholders. To those delegates who supported a 
free state constitution in order to end military rule, Potter pointed to 
Tennessee, whose people had abolished slavery over a year ago, yet was still 
occupied by federal troops. Potter concluded by stating that if Mississippi 
refused to acknowledge abolition, then the Union would be responsible for 
financially supporting the freedmen it had emancipated.,h
Although recognizing the complaints of the Potterites, the supporters of 
Section Two urged the political necessity of compliance with the federal 
government. Amos R. Johnston stated that the constitutionality of the 
Union s demands was irrelevant. "(I]t seems to me as clear as the beams of 
the sun that shine upon us today, that the course recommended by the 
Committee is the only course that can conduct us to the end which we desire 
to obtain." That goal was the restoration of home rule. If the convention 
failed to abolish slavery, the horrors of prolonged military rule and Negro 
equality and suffrage would ensue. William Yerger, a member of the 
committee, felt that obstinance on the part of the convention "would create 
useless discussions, North and South, and would prejudice hereafter the 
condition of the State, by ceaseless wrangling over an immaterial issue, which 
should be left to the historian." On the eve of surrender, in an attempt to 
display Mississippi's eagerness to return to normal relations with the Union, 
Confederate Governor Clark had sent Yerger and Sharkey to Washington to
uVbid, 56-70.
request the President s moderation and leniency toward the state. Recalling 
his interview with Johnson to the convention, Yerger recounted what the 
President had stated: in  the proposed Constitution, so as to restore vour
State to its relations with the Federal Government, there ought to be 
incorporated an amendment abolishing the institution of slavery.1' Yerger 
maintained that although the President was merely advising, not ordering, 
the convention, he stressed that federal troops would not be removed from 
Mississippi soil unless the state constitution formally recognized 
emancipation.17
After four days of deliberations, chairman Harrison offered a compromise, 
in which Section Two would begin, "The institution of slavery having been 
destroyed in the State of Mississippi,” to be followed by the original provision 
The delegates resoundingly accepted the provision with the amendment by a 
vote of eighty-seven to eleven. Although the preamble was ambiguous about 
the cause of emancipation, Mississippi had now complied with President 
Johnson s request.18
The assembly then tackled other pressing issues, the most important of 
which was the ordinance of secession from 1861. The Committee on 
Ordinances and Laws urged to declare the secession ordinance "null and 
void.” Opponents argued that if they declared the secession was illegal, then 
Confederates and their supporters could be prosecuted for treason. These 
delegates wanted to simply repeal the ordinance. After much debate, the 
convention easily adopted the committees original draft.,g
]7lbid, 45, 86, 146-47; Harris, Presidential Ret oust ruction in Mississippi, 40.
l^C'awi'w/ww Journal, 164-5; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction tn Mississippi, 54.
Journal, 54-38.
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The members also authorized all laws passed by the legislature since 1861 
which did not conflict with federal statutes or aid the rebellion. Although 
other resolutions dealing with the freedmen were proposed (such as vagrancy 
and colonization), the convention members felt that those issues were the 
responsibility of the upcoming legislature, which, along with state officers 
and Congressional representatives, were to be elected in early October. On 
Thursday, August 24, the convention adjourned, and four days later 
Governor Sharkey submitted the amended constitution and adopted 
ordinances to Secretary of State William H. Seward for the President s 
approval.20
The Mississippi Reconstruction Convention was a limited conservative 
success. It abolished slavery and nullified secession, but failed to ratify the 
proposed 13th Amendment. However, in an August 21 telegram to 
Governor Sharkey, the President had stated, "Your convention can adopt the 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or recommend its 
adoption by the legislature." Apparently, most delegates felt that the 
legislature should tackle that problem. The convention also ignored the 
President Johnson's request to grant a limited suffrage to the freedmen. The 
President expressed little concern, however, because the day the convention 
adjourned, he sent Sharkey a dispatch praising the work of the convention 
and promising to remove the federal troops and restore the writ of habeas 
corpus as soon as the state was restored to the Union via Congress. The 
President also expressed confidence that the remaining Southern states would 
follow Mississippi's example.21
20Drake, "Mississippi Reconstruction Convention," 246; Convention journal, 30-31, 277;
Ciarnc^fteconsfrucfioft in Mississippi, 93.
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Outside the executive branch, Northern reactions to the convention were 
mixed. Conservative elements in the North applauded the work of the 
convention. The New York Titties declared that, since the convention had 
hallowed the Presidential plan, 'Mississippi . . . has earned the right of being 
the exemplar for the sister (Southern 1 states. . . " And the Washington, l). C\ 
based National Intelligencer announced that Mississippi had resumed its 
place in the Union.22
On the other hand, many Republicans were disappointed that the 
convention refused to grant the freedmen any political rights. Senator 
C harles Sumner, a radical Republican and advocate of black suffrage, called 
the convention "a rebel conspiracy to obtain political power.” The Chicago 
Tribune called the proceedings "as unsatisfactory as they could be," and 
charged that only "one member of the convention . . . uttered anything that 
would pass at the North for Unionism.2*
Some Northern reporters were so skeptical of the convention s motives 
that they criticized the delegates for things they had not done. For example, 
many newspapers rebuked the assembly for memorializing the President to 
free Jefferson Davis and the remove all Negro troops from the state. Actually, 
both proposals were voted down by the delegates.24
The true nature of the convention was rather conservative. Although
2 *McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, 2(H); New York Times, Aug. 26, 1865.
-~New York Times, Sep, 1*J, 1865; Washington National Intelligencer, Sep. 1, 1865.
-  'New' York World, Sep. 16, 1865, tpioted in Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, cMn 
C hicago Tribune, Aug. 2 ,^ 1865.
- 2 *4 Drake, ’Mississippi Reconstruction Convention," 250.
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some members of the convention displayed rebellious and defiant attitudes, 
most delegates were driven by the desire to restore law and order and regain 
control of their political affairs as speedily as possible. In addition, the threat 
of federal troops and the heat of the Northern limelight probably helped to 
moderate the members even further. The New York Times warned that 
what "hinders the South from being embraced again is the doubt oi the 
sincerity of its repentance," and the Mississippi convention attempted to 
openly display that sincerity.*^
Parly in the convention, convention member John VV. C Watson, in 
response to Northern doubts and preconceptions, requested that the 
proceedings and debates be published. "1 believe that the spirit breathed by 
the members of this Convention will be of such a character as to vindicate the 
State from the aspersions that are constantly being cast on her," he declared. 
Another delegate agreed, saying, "It is also necessary . . . that we should show 
. that it is a mistake to suppose that in surrendering . . . we merely did it to 
gain . . . time . . . to carry on the war against . . . the Federal Government." 
The resolution to publish the proceedings was quickly adopted.
In another display of openness, tne delegate invited Major General 
Osterhaus, the federal Commandant of the District of Mississippi, to sit at the 
convention. He accepted. According to an important Southern newspaper, 
nearly all the members of the convention were slaveowners. Because they 
had voted to abolish slavery, they were obviously sincere "(The Convention] 
is the voice of the real people of Mississippi," the editor declared.2/
 ^'Ibid, 233; New York Times, Sep. 6, 1863.
n journal, 26-27.
'Ibid, "*3, 43; New Orleans Daily Picayune, Aug. 23, 1865.
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With the firm approval of President Johnson and conservative 
Northerners, the Mississippi Reconstruction Convention was a successful 
initial step toward the restoration of civil government in the state 
Mississippians believed that their elected representatives would join 
Congress and that their state government would regain its sovereignty over 
stale concerns. Perhaps they should have paid more attention to the 
cautionary, albeit optimistic, advice of the August 28 New York Times, 
written on the heels of the convention's adjournment:
We trust th.it the Legislature will utterly demolish the old black code, and 
that all its new enactments, respecting the freodmen, will be such as will 
satisfy all their reasonable triends and the government at Washington. This 
will bo realized if the l egislature performs in good faith what the convention 
has enjoined upon it
^N ew  York Times, Aug. 29,1865.
Chapter Three: The Passage of The Black Code
Before the convention had adjourned, on August 23, most ot the delegates 
met in a caucus to choose conservative candidates for the coming elections 
Their gubernatorial nominee was Ephraim S. Fisher, a Union Whig who had 
served on the state's High Court of Errors and Appeals in the 1850s. Fisher 
had avoided the war until 1864, when he accepted the position of colonel in 
the home guara. Thus, he was not tainted as a secessionist. One of the most 
influential postwar Whigs, Wisher received the support of William Verger, 
provisional Governor Sharkey, and President Johnson himself. The 
convention caucus also nominated Unionist candidates for four 
congressional seats, although they failed to choose a candidate from the fifth 
district. Though three of the four nominees had sejved in the Confederacy, 
they all had opposed secession. Because the caucus chose conservative Whig 
candidates, the selections reflected the attitudes of the convention. 1
By the time of the election on October 2, 1865, Mississippi was in a state of 
hysteria. The freedmen, uncertain of their status and hopeful of acquiring 
land via the Freedmens Bureau, were not returning to their former masters 
fields. Therefore, the planters faced severe labor shortages, and the prospects 
for the following year s crops were becoming questionable. In addition, 
rumors of a Negro insurrection at Christmas were sweeping the state. The
hkirris, Presidential Reamstruction in Mississippi, 104*5.
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duty of the new state government would be to quell these fears by restoring 
effective civil government in the state. The people of Mississippi were 
demanding levee and railroad repairs, a compensation for the debts owed 
Mississippians by the Confederacy, and, most importantly, a new definition of 
the Negro s role in Mississippi society, economically, politically, and socially. 
The editor of the Meridian Daily Clarion voiced the anticipations of the state:
Before this body will bo brought the most momentous issues over imposed upon «i 
legislature m the Southern States. It is for them to preserve intact the leading 
features of our new constitution, and qualify the state for immediate 
representation in the national council. Hitherto the course pursued bv 
Mississippi has met the approbation of the President and his cabinet, and has 
boon viewed by other states as a criterion to shape their political destiny. We 
feel proud in the assurance that this august assemblage is actuated by one aim 
and desire.^
Two candidates opposed Fisher in the race for governor. Benjamin G. 
Humphreys, also a Whig, had opposed secession, but he later became a 
brigadier general in the Confederate army. Later, when questioned by the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction, Sharkey defended 
I lumphreys, declaring, "There was no man in the State of Mississippi more 
opposed to secession than he was." Although he never announced his 
candidacy, Humphreys was popular, especially among the Confederate 
veterans. This alone would provide enough support for Humphreys to 
compete effectively with Fisher for the gubernatorial seat. Under the terms
-ibid: Meridian Daily Clarion, Oct. 17, 1865.
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established by President Johnson, however, Humphreys was not eligible for 
the office, and he had not yet been pardoned. The final candidate was 
William S. Patton, a Union Democrat with popular support from the eastern 
part of the state, commonly called the Piney Woods area. Although Patton 
had served as the speaker of the house in the state legislature from 1852 to 
1854, he was not well known outside the Piney Woods region.**
Due to the lack of effective communication throughout most of the state, 
the gubernatorial campaign was somewhat confusing. In several 
northeastern counties, Humphreys’ candidacy was unknown until after the 
election. In addition, rumors abounded that Humphreys had withdrawn 
from the election because of his ineligibility. Nevertheless, and despite the 
fact that several newspapers attempted to "keep him off track,” Humphreys 
was elected governor, polling 19,000 votes. Fisher finished second with 
15,500. None of the candidates actively campaigned, and apparently the only 
difference between Humphreys and Fisher was the degree of support each had 
given to the Confederacy. 1lumphreys' record as a brigadier general who had 
defended the state was more impressive. As in the elections for other state 
offices, Mississippians tended to vote for the candidate who had opposed 
secession yet actively supported the Confederacy during the war. Ironically, 
an overwhelming majority of Union officers and soldiers who had chosen to 
reside permanently in Mississippi voted for Humphreys.* 4
Immediately following his election, Humphreys wrote President Johnson
■'earner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 95; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in 
M ississippi, 106.
4 Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 106-7, 110-12; Meridian Daily Clarion,
Ocl. 6, 1865.
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that a "majority of my fellow citizens, believing clemency would be extended 
to me, and in view of my political antecedents, elected me to the office of 
Governor." Despite angry reaction from the Northern press, Johnson, at the 
advice of provisional Governor Sharkey, pardoned 1 lumphrevs, and the new 
governor was inaugurated on October 16.^
Unlike the race for governor, the campaigns for the other state offices 
featured debatable issues, mostly concerning the freedmen. Nearly all white 
Mississippians felt that regulation of Negro labor was a necessity. The major 
difference between two candidates was often their stand on Negro testimony 
in court. On September 25, only one week prior to the elections, provisional 
Governor Sharkey issued a proclamation allowing blacks to sue, be sued, and 
testify in the state civil courts. Previously, all cases involving the freedmen 
had been tried in federal military courts, in which blacks and whites were 
treated equally Colonel Samuel Thomas, the assistant commissioner of the 
Freedmens Bureau in the district, proposed to Sharkey to transfer all cases 
involving freedmen to the civil courts, as long as both races would be 
accorded equal treatment under the law. Governor Sharkey, believing that 
the new constitution abolished all policies contingent upon slavery and 
authorized the protection of the property and person of the freedmen, 
promptly accepted Colonel Thomas' proposal. He issued a proclamation 
requiring the judiciary to “allow negroes the same rights and privileges as are 
accorded to white men before the courts." Although Negro testimony was a 
controversial and volatile campaign issue in counties along the lines of
^Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 112; Garner, Reconstruction in 
M ississippi, 95.
communication, the fact that there were only seven days between Sharkey s 
proclamation and election day prevented its importance throughout most of 
the state.*1
In the counties in which Negro testimony affected the election, two 
tactions formed. The anti-testimony party, led by convention delegates 
George L. Potter and F.dward M. Yerger, both Whigs from Jackson, cautioned 
against granting the freed men any civil rights whatsoever. The editor of the 
Jackson News announced the fear behind the anti-testimony platform:
’ Negroes as a class must be excluded from the witness stand. If the privilege 
is ever granted, it will lead to greater demands, and at last end in the 
admission of the negro to the jury box and the ballot box.” The anti­
testimony party sought to keep the freedmen 'in the position which God 
almighty intended him to occupy; a position inferior to the white man 
(italics sic].”7
The candidates supporting Negro testimony, the conservatives, hoped to 
carry further the work of the convention. To them, ’’protection” in the new 
constitution implied the right to testify in court. Anyway, conservatives 
argued, Negro testimony was already a policy initiated by Governor Sharkey, 
and the federal government would not allow it to be removed. This 
moderate stance was supported by the influential Jackson Daily Clarion 
(which had moved from Meridian, Mississippi on November 4). Its editor
^Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 107; Meridian Daily t 'lanon, 1,
10, 1865.
7Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 107; Jackson News, quoted in Garner,
Reconstruction in Mississippi, 94; Jackson News, Nov. 14, 1865, quoted in Harris, Presidential
Reconstruction in Mississippi, 124.
stated:
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We do not belie\v that unusual and rigorous legislation to this class of 
population will promote our true interests. It is evidently the better policy to 
stimulate their industry, show that we desire their improvement, and satisfy 
the most skeptical that our laws afford them protection and security
The conservatives wanted to support President Johnson s program and 
mollify the radical Republicans in the Congress. The editor of the Quitman 
Messenger stated bluntly, How are we to escape Negro evidence, when the 
President himself demands it, and if the state do not yield, will force it upon 
us by the bayonet?” Incidentally, both leading candidates lor governor, 
I lumphreys and Fisher, supported Negro testimony s
Like the convention two months before, the Whigs triumphed in the 
election. In addition to the position of governor, Whigs won all five 
congressional seats. Every one had opposed secession, but four had occupied 
important positions within the Confederacy. The Whigs also secured a 
majority in the state legislature. In the senate, there were seventeen Whigs 
and fourteen Democrats. Of the ninety-eight seats in the lower chamber, fifty- 
two were Whigs, thirty-nine were Democrats, and seven belonged to other 
parties.9
Only four of the legislators had been delegates to the secession convention
^Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 107-8; Jackson Daily Clarion, Nov. 12,
1865; Quitman Messenger, quoted in Meridian Daily Clarion, Oct. 4, 1865.
9I (arris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 109-14.
of 1861; of these, three had voted for the Union. Sixteen of the thirty-one 
senators had served in past Mississippi legislatures, while only one-fourth of 
the representatives possessed any legislative experience. Surprisingly, only 
fourteen of the new lawmakers had participated in the reconstruction 
convention. Apparently, most of the delegates felt that they had performed 
their duties and now wanted to re-establish their businesses and plantations 
However, several leaders from the convention sought higher offices. Three 
were elected Congressmen, and George l Potter lost in his bid for the High 
Court of Hrrors and Appeals. William Verger simply returned to his lucrative* 
private law practice. Despite the victory of the conservative Whigs, according 
to one historian, the anti-testimony party secured a majority in the 
legislature. Like the election for the convention, the voter turnout was down 
forty-two percent from the I860 presidential election Once again, the public 
tended to refrain from choosing secessionists, but they also avoided whole­
hearted Unionists. The Whigs, who generally occupied the middle ground 
between these two extremes, capitalized and prevailed in the election 10
When a joint session of the legislature convened on October 16, 1865, the 
lawmakers’ first goal was to elect two United States Senators. This proved to 
be no easy task. Several legislators, elected on a platform opposed to Negro 
testimony, offered a resolution to block Sharkey s election to the Senate. The 
popular governor had announced his candidacy months before. Angered by 
Sharkey’s recent proclamation, which guaranteed the freedmen's rights in
h^Garncr, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 94-95; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in
Mississippi, 109-14.
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court, the group declared:
Th.1t wv. the Son.it. >r- of tlu* Slate ol M iv ^ T P 1- wMI MIPPl,rl no ,f’r ,ho 
I'niUll State, Senate, who t, . r sh.ill bo in tavor ol giving to the slave, thus 
manumit,ed, any rights, uul, political or social, further than was urn, lisa led 
unto the person and property ot the domicabated tree negro be the statutes ol 
the State prior to the Kite ro\ oiution.
This m o t i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  was t a b l e d  b y  a v o t e  o t  21-H in t h e  s e n a t e  Sharkey 
t h e n  p r o m p t l y  d e f e a t e d  i u l t o n  A n d e r s o n ,  a n  i n i l u e n t t a l  Whig l a w y e r ,  In a 
v o t e  ot  1 0 0 - 2 6  11
The second seat, however, took tour ballots before lames I Alcorn, a 
former slaveowner and Confederate general who also tacored Negro 
testimony, was elected Democrats, determined to elect a fellow party 
member to the Senate, had united behind Samuel J. Ciholson, a leader ot the 
anti-testimony party. The thought of Ciholson, a tormer tire-eating 
secessionist, representing Mississippi in Washington, appalled the Whigs, 
who feared hostile reactions and reprisals from the North Consequently, the 
Whigs combined to select Ciholson as speaker of the house, therein 
disallowing his chances tor a position in the Senate. The Mississippi press 
praised the seven men elected for the Congressional delegation, all 
representatives of the Whig party Many editors were confident that their 
newly elected representatives would be accepted by Congress.12 1
11 Meridian Daily Clarion, Oct. 22, 186S; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
118-20.
12Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 118-20.
The split in the legislature remained throughout the fall term. Democrats, 
led by speaker Gholson and II. R. Taylor, formed the basis of the anti- 
testimony party. As stated earlier, these men were opposed to granting any 
rights to the freed men. Indifferent to the sentiments in the North, the anti­
testimony group sought to place the freedmen on the same level as prewar 
free blacks. In antebellum Mississippi, the rights of free Negroes were 
severely restricted. Although they possessed full property rights, free blacks 
could not own firearms, engage in selling groceries or liquor, or move freely 
outside their home county. They were not allowed to vote, serve on a jury, 
or testily in a case involving a white person. Some Mississippi newspapers 
echoed the sentiments of the anti-testimony party, warning the members of 
the legislature that their duty was to save the freedmen from injustice by 
forcing them back to the plantations.11
On the other hand, conservatives in the legislature proposed moderate 
laws reflecting the intent of the new constitution. By guaranteeing the civil 
rights of the freedmen, conservatives hoped to appease the North and satisfy 
the freedmen. However, the conservatives were not motivated by a generous 
regard for the former slaves. They merely wanted a speedy restoration of civil 
government and a return to economic stability The Natchez Democrat 
proclaimed:
It will only require kind treatment, a fair recompense for faithful labor, and a 
disposition to make the Negroes happy and comfortable, to restore a healthy 
and permanent system of labor. Negroes under this system will become
11Ibid, 121-24; Charles S. Sydnor, "The Free Negro in Mississippi Before the War,”
American Historical Review, 32 (1927), 770.
permanent fixtures of the plantations.
The main argument behind the conservatives' position was one of political 
expediency To the editor of the Friars Point Coahomiatt, Negro testimony 
was "not as nauseating a dose as negro equality in all political privileges. It 
we reject it, it may be forced upon us at the point of the bayonet."14
Most of the lawyers in Mississippi supported Negro testimony, and 
according to the Meridian Daily Clarion, "the most influential papers of the 
State are now in favor of granting the negro the right to appear before the 
law " The Clarion'x editor lectured that "a few months moie will convince 
them all that we were only preparing the public mind for coming events' -- 
for measures vve cannot avoid, no matter what our wishes may be." A course 
of moderation toward the freedmen, however, should not instill fear into 
white Mississippians. A united press maintained that ours will ever be a 
government of white people, and under no circumstances can there be 
equality between the races in the South." If the freedmen were unhappy in 
Mississippi, they were welcome to "seek asylum in some other land."
In addition to most of the press, several prominent statesmen encouraged 
moderation toward the freedmen. Sharkey cautioned the legislature to 
follow the new constitution by fully protecting the property and person of the 
freedmen. And tormer U. S. Senator Walker Brooke expressed his confidence
^Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 126-27; Natchez D e m o c r a t , Nov. 18,
1865, quoted in Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 126; Friars Point 
Coahomian, Oct. 27, 1865.
lamer, Reconst nation in Mississippi, 94; Meridian Daily Clarion, Oct. 1, 10, 1865.
that the state would fully guarantee Negro rights. In his inaugural address, 
Governor Humphreys, albeit somewhat vaguely, cautioned that the 
freedinen must be allowed to progress as high as they could, which required 
the protection of their rights and property Humphreys declared, however, 
The purity and progress of both races require that caste be* maintained. ”1h 
The most pressing concern to the legislature was the status of the 
thousands of freed men living in the state. A Joint Committee on Freedmen 
was established to study and recommend any laws necessary
tor the protection and security of the person and property ot the freed men of 
this State, including their social relations toward each other, tnat ot husband 
and wife, and parent and child; and what laws are necessary to make their 
labor available to the agricultural interests of the State, and to protect the 
State from the support of minors, vagrants and paupers.
Speaker Gholson, despite his opposition to Negro testimony, apparently 
appointed more conservatives to the committee.17
The pressures on the Joint Committee were tremendous As freedmen 
hesitated to contract for work for the following year, and rumors ot 
insurrections swept the state, demands for rigorous law's increased. Former 
Mississippi governor William McWillie urged the legislature to force the 
freedmen back to the fields and to punish severely lawbreakers of both races. 
Some members of the press concurred with McWillie. The Jackson Ncica 
declared, "We are with him too for erecting the cheaper and quicker engines
^’Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 126-28.
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of punishment, the gallows, whipping post and pillory for all offenders of all 
colors." Evidently, people were most concerned with establishing law and 
order, regardless of race.18
The Joint Committee on Freedmen was chaired by Horatio F. Simrall, a 
conservative Whig lawyer and planter from Wilkinson County. Simrall was 
called the ablest man in the house. He had served in the Kentucky legislature 
before the war, and he had occupied a chair of law at the University of 
Louisville. He had recently moved to Mississippi, where he participated in 
the Confederate "council" for Kentucky.19
Before considering any legislation, the Joint Committee heard the 
suggestions of a committee created by the convention to recommend any laws 
or changes needed to accommodate the new constitution. Chaired by Whig 
Judge Robert S. Hudson, the convention committee suggested no specific 
laws, but urged the legislature to:
deny the freedmen some unbridled privileges for the present, not from any 
apprehension or sense of danger to the white population, but from the clear 
conviction that such denial and restrictions will b»* for their present and 
ultimate good in the suppression of vice, idleness, vagia^y, impositions and 
poverty, the promotion of industry, and the diminution *f crime and its long 
train of baneful consequences and monstrous evils.
The committee admitted imperfections in its recommendations, but declared 
their confidence that if harsh measures were adopted, order would be
18/Wd, 124; Jackson News, quoted in New Orleans Daily Picayune, Nov. 1, 18b5.
^Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 124-25
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established, business would be stimulated, and both races ould be satisfied. 
The report added, almost apologetically, "While some of the proposed 
legislation may seem rigid and stringent to the sickly modern humanitarians, 
they (the proposals] can never disturb ... the good and true ... of either race 
Anyway, the legislation proposed was of a temporary nature.
By timely .nut thorough legislation now, such healthy improvements in the 
huhits ... of both races will soon result, as to enable the State to modify her 
laws and proclaim to all her people the generous plaudit of Well dime good and 
taithful servants.'
Apparently to fool the North, the convention committee proposed to limit 
severely the rights of the freedmen only until they were fully qualified lor 
their freedom, whenever that would be.20
After debating for over two weeks, the Joint Committee on Freedmen 
presented its report on November b. The most controversial proposal was 
titled "An Act to confer Civil Rights upon the Freedmen and Other 
Measures." Divided into twelve sections, this bill, which formed the basis ol 
what became known as the Black Code,"’ was intended to define the role of 
blacks in postwar Mississippi society. Section one granted the freedmen the 
right to sue in Mississippi state courts. It also allowed blacks to acquire 
property just as whites did,
Provided, That he provisions of this section shall not be so construed as to 
allow any freedmen, free negro, or mulatto to rent or lease' any lands or
^Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26. 1865.
tenements except in incorporated cities or towns, in which places the corporate 
authorities shall control the same.
This section was adopted with little debate by the legislature. Although the 
bill did allow blacks to purchase land freely, it restricted them Irom renting or 
leasing, which aroused great hostility in the North. Obviously, few blacks 
would have the resources to buy farmland, and by barring them from renting, 
the bill would keep blacks on farms only as laborers.21
Southerners agreed on the bill's intent. The Friars Point Coahomuin, 
describing the act, declared that blacks were prohibited from purchasing 
farmland. And Giles Hillyer, a representative from Adams County, 
supported the bill because he believed it kept blacks from purchasing land. 
Apparently, the legislature, fearing that nests of idle freedmen would 
congregate on farms and engage in crime, sought to keep the freedmen on 
white plantations. However, at the same time, they hoped to appease the 
North with vague language which technically did allow blacks to own 
property. When Commissioner Howard of the Freedmen s Bureau learned 
of the section, he instructed district commander Colonel Thomas to ignore 
the proviso.22
Section two of the bill allowed free Negroes, freedmen, and mulattoes to 
intermarry legally, and section three legalized previous black common law
21' An Act to confer Civil Rights on the Freedmen and other Measures," in Walter L. Fleming,
Documentary History of Reconstruction, (2 vols., Glouchester, Massachusetts, I960), 1: 286.
Friars Point Coahomian, Dec. 1, 1865; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi,
130-31.
marriages. This section also made intermarriage between the races a felony 
carrying a penalty of imprisonment for life. Section four, however, caused 
the greatest debate in the legislature. The committee proposed to allow Negro 
testimony in civil cases in which freedmen, free blacks, or mulattoes were 
parties. The fate of the civil rights act hinged on the success of this section, 
because many legislators had been elected on a pledge of no Negro testimony. 
These men vowed to defeat the bill.23
Gholson immediately denounced the proposal. The speaker of the house 
declared that provisional governor Sharkey had been appointed without 
constitutional authority, and that the action of the convention was forced 
under the pressure of negro bayonets.” Now, the legislature was pandering 
to the North while ignoring the best interests of the state. 1 le then proceeded 
to chastise several Mississippi newspapers for "threatening” the legisla e.24 
In response to Gholson's accusation, the Jackson Daily Clarion retorted:
Wo think it is clear that there is no way by which we can be restored to 
Congress, military domination superseded by civil authority, order and 
industry established, the resources of the country developed, but in our cordial 
and earnest support of the programme for restoration laid down by President 
johnson. The responsibility of accepting or rejecting these conditions of union in 
a great degree rests with the present Legislature.
Simrall, as chairman of the Joint Committee, also spoke in support of the
"An Act to confer Civil Rights," 286-87; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi,
132.
24Jackson Daily Clarion, Nov. 14, 1865; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi,
132-33.
proposed bill. Defending the entire bill, he stressed the proposal’s potential to 
“stimulate drooping and despondent energy, to revive industry, and to put 
the idle to labor.” To Simrall, the legislature had a “moral obligation” to 
extend “remedial justice” to the freedmen by opening the courts to their 
testimony. Simrall concluded his speech, which was reprinted in several 
newspapers, by stressing that Negroes would never be citizens of the United 
States. Therefore, Negro testimony would not be the first step to political 
equality.
Many conservatives felt that their admission to Congress depended 
mainly on the success of section four. The Clarion implored the legislature 
to adopt Negro testimony, using precedence as persuasion. In Louisiana 
before the war, free blacks possessed the same rights as whites in court. The 
editor recalled no complaints of “negro equality" in Louisiana. Therefore, the 
Clarion urged, the state should grant the freedmen civil rights and shatter 
the radical Republicans’ hopes to deny their admittance to Congress.* 26
After two days of ferocious debate, the house defeated section four by a 
vote of fifty to forty. Reactions by the press and the President were similar 
C.U. Manlove, e former Confederate colonel and the current editor of the 
Vicksburg journal, lectured the house. "We tell you, plainly, gentlemen, 
that in less than a year you will be compelled to do that which you have 
refused voluntarily to do," he predicted. The editor continued, “The negro
^Jackson Daily Clarion, Nov. 14, 18, 1865; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in 
Mississippi, 133.
26jackson Daily Clarion, Nov. 8, 1865
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has to be protected by the laws of Mississippi or by Federal bayonets. Our 
legislature has chosen the latter.” President Johnson also expressed his 
disappointment. On November 17, the President wired Governor 
Humphreys and warned that federal troops wo il remain in Mississippi 
until the freedmen were protected under the law. Simultaneously, Johnson 
dispatched General George Thomas, district commander of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau, to urge the legislature to pass measures protecting the freedmen.27
On November 20, Governor Humphreys, who had previously been silent 
on the controversies occupying the legislature, finally addressed the problems 
created by emancipation. Apparently persuaded by the President s telegram, 
1 lumphreys spoke to a joint session of the legislature:
We must now meet the question as it is. and not as we would like to have it. The 
rule must be justice. The negro is free, whether we like it or not; we must realize 
that fact now and forever. To be free, however, does not make him a citizen, or 
entitle him to political and social equality with the white man. But the 
constitution and justice do entitle him to protection and security in his person 
and property, both real and personal.
The governor declared that no man can be protected except through ’an 
independent and enlightened judiciary.” Therefore, the courts must be open 
to the freedmen and their testimony.28
Humphreys, however, was not completely cooperative with the wishes of 
the President. In his speech he lambasted the Freedmen’s Bureau. The war
U\bid, Nov. 19, 1865; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 133.
28Humphreys’ address to the legislature is located in Johannsen, Reconstruction, 40-42.
42
was not as horrible or destructive, Humphreys intoned, as the ‘last six or 
eight months from the administration of this black incubus.” According to 
the governor, the Freedmen s Bureau did not protect the rights of white men. 
In Humphreys’ mind, this fact should further motivate the legislature to 
adopt Negro testimony and rid the state of this federal menace. In 
concluding, Humphreys announced three important recommendations. 
First, the legislature should add Negro testimony to protect the freed men and 
society. Second, laws should be established to encourage the freedmen to 
work to support their families. And third, Humphreys suggested passage of a 
law allowing the state militia to suppress riots.
The speech was received favorably in the North, but many doubted the 
sincerity of the Mississippi governor. The New York Tiwrs stated:
The recommendations are sensible and practicable, but were made with a wry 
face and with bad grace. He accepts the abolition of slavery fully and without 
reserve, but could not avoid saying it was done under pressure of Federal 
bayonets.
The state legislature was also responsive to the speech. On November 22, the 
house1, with Gholson’s support, agreed to reconsider the bill
But the anti-testimony party was not easily converted. Senator M. I) I. 
Stephens offered a substitute for the entire act, entitled, "An act to protect 
freedmen, free negroes or mulattoes." Under this restrictive proposal, blacks
~**lbid.
-™New York Times, Dec. 3, 1865, quoted in Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 112n;
Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 134-35.
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would have no rights or privileges. Instead, they would be represented by 
members of the county police. These guardians would oversee the contracts 
and work performance of their “clients.'' To avoid Negro testimony, »he bill 
authorized that all legal suits for the freedmen would be handled through 
their respective agents. This blatant attempt to sidestep the original bill was 
tabled by the senate, and the legislature promptly returned to the previous 
proposal.
Apparently swayed by Governor Humphreys’ speech, on November 21 the 
house of representatives passed the civil rights bill with section four intact, by 
a vote of 56-30. The bill also narrowly passed the senate, 16-13. According to 
the Jackson Daily Clarion, Many members who came here opposed to the 
measure, on reflection and after hearing the question fully discussed, have 
given it their support." In addition to the expected split by the Whigs and the 
Democrats, a clear sectional pattern emerged in the vote. The river counties, 
consisting mostly of planters, totally supported the bill, while the southern 
counties, made up of small farmers and poor w’hites, opposed the measure.32
On November 25, Governor Humphreys signed the civil rights act into 
law. In addition to the four sections concerning civil rights, eight sections 
were devoted to the economic aspects of the freedmen’s new position. 
Section five required all blacks (including mulattoes) to have written 
evidence of homes and occupations by the second Monday of January, 1866, 
and each year thereafter. If the individual was engaged in irregular work of 31
31 Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 134-35.
3-New Orleans Daily Picayune, Nov. 28, 1865; Jackson Daily Clarion, Nov. 22, 1865; Harris, 
Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 136.
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any kind, he must possess written permission from the mayor or the board of 
police in his county Section six specified that if a Negro quit his job without 
good cause, ‘ he shall forfeit his wages for that year up to the time of 
quitting."^
The next three sections were designed to ensure that freedmen complied 
with the rules of their contracts. Any citizen was authorized to arrest a 
wandering worker and return him to his employer. The arrester would be 
compensated according to the distance travelled. However, if the freedman 
could prove that he had left due to good cause, the employer would be fined 
accordingly. In addition, anyone attempting to persuade any black to desert 
his place of legal employment would be charged with a misdemeanor and 
fined from twenty-five to two hundred dollars.* 4
The tenth section made it legal for any black to charge anyone, white or 
black, 'with a criminal offense against his or her person or property." 
Therefore, the freedmen were granted full civil rights in the courts. 
1 lowever, in a supplementary bill passed a few days later, the legislature 
directed that if any black was found making a false affidavit against any white, 
that individual was responsible not only to pay a fine of up to fifty dollars, but 
also to cover the costs of the case. In addition, the offender could be 
imprisoned for up to twenty days, and if he could not afford the fines, he 
coed J  be hired out by auction to pay the all the costs, including jail fees.**
* * ‘An Act to confer Civil Rights," 287-88.
* 4 /W.
55if,id; Theodore B.Wilson, The Black Codes of the South (University, Alabama, l%5), 67.
In addition to the civil rights act, several other laws were passed which 
constituted the 'Black Code of Mississippi. Also on November 22, the 
legislature approved "An Act to regulate the relation of Master and 
Apprentice, as relates to Freed men, Free Negroes, and Mulattoes." Under this 
measure, probate courts were authorized to apprentice any black orphans or 
minors whose parents could not support them to a suitable white guardian 
The act stated "that the former owner of said minors shall have the 
preference when, in the opinion of the court, he or she shall be a suitable 
person for that purpose." The ward of each apprentice was directed to supply 
"sufficient food and clothing; to treat ... humanely; lurnish medical attention 
in case of sickness; land) teach ... him or her to read and write, if under fifteen 
voars old." The guardian was allowed to use moderate corporal punishment 
on the child, but "in no case shall cruel or inhuman punishment be 
inflicted." The provisions concerning apprentices who abandoned their 
masters were similar to the above conditions for workers. According to the 
new state Attorney General, Charles F. Hooker, the apprentice law' was 
designed to "give protection and direction to that large class of black minors 
who have been recently freed and to prevent this class of persons from 
becoming a tax upon the public treasury."^6
A new vagrant law was enacted to ensure that the freedmen would 
contract for the following year. Under this provision,
all rogues and \ , (bonds, idle and dissipated persons, jugglers, or persons
^'M ississippi Apprentice Law," in Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction, 1: 282- 
83; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 137-38.
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practicing unlawful games or plays, runaways, common drunkards, common 
night-walkers, pilferers, lewd, wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or 
behavior, common railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or 
employment, misspend what they earn, or do not provide for the support of 
themselves or their families, or dependants (sicI, and all other idle and 
disorderly persons
would be considered vagrants, liable to be fined up to one hundred dollars 
and imprisoned up to twenty days. Blacks unemployed on the second 
Monday of every January or found meeting illegally would be considered 
vagrants. White persons caught assembling with blacks would also be 
deemed vagrants. Ironically, whites guilty of this offense could be 
imprisoned for six months, while blacks could be held for only ten days. l:or 
most equal offenses, blacks faced much more severe penalties than did 
whites. 3 ?
The vagrant act also instituted a one dollar poll tax created specifically for 
blacks. The money collected would constitute a Freedmen's Pauper Fund, 
which would help support indigent freedmen and free blacks. Any black 
refusing to pay the poll tax was considered a vagrant, and if unable to pay the 
fine, could be hired out to the lowest-bidding employer. This applied to all 
vagrants.38
On paper, the vagrant law applied to both races, but it was specifically 
designed for the freedmen. For instance, only blacks could be hired out if they 
failed to pay the fine for vagrancy. Also, whites were not required to show
^"Mississippi Vagrant Law," in Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction, 1: 283*84
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evidence of employment each January. And poor whites were not slapped 
with a poll tax, as were the freedmen. Each of the above laws was a deliberate 
effort by the legislature to restrict severely the economic freedom and 
mobility of the black population. The simple aim of white Mississippians was 
to compel the freedmen to return to the plantations.
To account for any oversight, the legislature enacted "An Act to punish 
certain offences therein named, and for other purposes." This final law 
forbade blacks from possessing firearms, ammunition, or knives. In addition, 
any Negro
committing riots routs, affrays, trespasses, malicious mischief, cruel treatment 
to animals, seditious speeches, insulting gestures, language, or acts, or assaults 
on any person, disturbance of the peace, exercising the function of a minister of 
the Gospel without a license ..., vending spirituous or intoxicating liquors, or 
committing any other misdemearor, the punishment of which is not 
specifically provided for by law
could be fined up to ten dollars and imprisoned for thirty days. The vague 
language allowed Mississippi police to arrest any black for nearly any 
behavior they disliked. Once again, any black convicted who refused to pay 
the accompanying fines could be hired out to any white person willing to pay 
the costs.39
Although the Mississippi laws were severely restrictive to the freedmen, 
the Black Code was not a unique document of extreme harshness. The
3 9 'Certain Offenses of Freedmen," in Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction, 1:
289-90.
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vagrancy law resembled those in states such as Wisconsin, New York, Maine, 
Indiana, Connecticut, and even Massachusetts, the bastion of abolitionism. 
Five Northern states forbade Negro testimony in cases involving whites, and 
Oregon prohibited blacks from acquiring real estate and making contracts. 
The Meridian Daily Clarion happily informed its readers that the Indiana 
state constitution prevented blacks from selling anything in ti e state. Clearly, 
the Mississippi legislature had several precedents to draw from Northern 
states.40
The Freedmen's Bureau had instituted other precedents for the state to 
follow. For example, the Bureau created a pass system to regulate the 
movement of the freedmen and approved the enforcement of written 
contracts between planters and freedmen. And General Howard, the 
Commissioner of the Freedmen’s Bureau, recommended the institution of 
rigid vagrant laws to Colonel Samuel Thomas, the assistant commissioner in 
Mississippi. Although Thomas emphasized that no law limiting the 
freedmen’s rights to testify or obtain property would be recognized, the 
Bureau implicitly approved a strict code regarding the freedmen’s economic 
rights.41
Mississippi's refusal to provide for Negro suffrage was also not unique, in 
1865, only four Northern states granted blacks equal suffrage, while seventeen 
others allowed only white suffrage. In addition, despite the fact that the 
Republican party controlled each state, three state referendums permitting
40C.arnor, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 118-19; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in 
Mississippi, 128; Meridian Dailf/ Clarion, Aug. 17, 1865.
41llarris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 129-30.
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black suffrage failed. When Connecticut voters defeated black suffrage by one 
thousand votes in mid-1865, the Meridian Daily Clarion ran the story under 
the title "As We Hxpected." The editor predicted, "This will be a heavy blow 
to the republicans, and will be of material benefit to the South." The ex- 
Confederates failed or refused to recognize the fact that their situation was not 
analogous to the Northern states. According to Republicans, Northerners 
were entitled to decide on Negro suffrage. However, in the South, black 
suffrage was required to ensure the defeated section's loyalty to the Union 
and the ascendancy of the Republican Party. According to the Republican 
Party platform of 1868, black suffrage was "demanded by every consideration 
of public safety, of gratitude, and of justice." A Republican-dominated 
Congress was not about to allow Mississippi to escape Negro suffrage before 
Reconstruction had run its course.42
Before adjourning in early December, the state legislature made one more 
decision which in time it would regret. In August, President Johnson had 
urged the convention to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing 
slavery, but it had failed to do so. When it appeared that the legislature might 
also ignore the amendment, the President wired Sharkey in November: "I 
trust in God that the legislature will adopt the amendment, and thereby make 
the way clear for the admission of senators and representatives to their seats 
in the present Congress." The legislators, however, were unconvinced. The 
Jackson Daily Clarion remarked, "Viewed in any way we please, it is nothing 
less than a perfect Pandora s Box." Mississippians accepted the first section of
42Wilson, Black Codes of the South, 64; Eric Foner, Reconstruction: 2863 1877 (New York,
1988), 222; Meridian Daily Clarion, Oct. 6, 1865; C. Vann Woodward, ’Equality: America’s
Deferred Commitment," The American Scholar, 27 (Autumn 1958), 469.
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the amendment, which abolished slavery, but refused to endorse section two, 
which would enable Congress to pass laws enforcing the first section. 
According to the Clarion, Mississippians wanted to
show the whole world that we intend to keep our laith inviolate by abolishing 
slavery forever, but we cannot accede to the demand for the surrender into the 
hands of Congress of all the rights pertaining to our domestic concerns, which 
come properly within the limits of, and belong exclusively to State laws and 
State Administration.
Despite the President's pleas, on December 4, the legislature chose not to ratify 
the amendment.4^
When the state legislature adjourned on December 6, Mississippi had thus 
enacted the first of the Black Codes of the South. In fact, Mississippi's laws 
defining the status of the freedmen formed the basis of the Black Codes of 
other Southern states. It is clear that white Mississippians wanted to regain 
economic stability, and by compelling the freedmen to return to the 
plantations, they felt their labor problems would cease to exist. Mississippi, 
the largest cotton-producing state prior to the Civil War, could return to its 
former glory. However, white Mississippians were not only concerned with 
economics. The legislature passed many acts designed to limit the freedmen’s 
social mobility as well. In fact, a move to outlaw black immigration into the 
state nearly passed the house. This indicates that the lawmakers were not 
merely concerned with solving their labor shortage. Furthermore, it
4\lcKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, 2(K); Jackson Daily Clarion, N ov . 8, 1865; 
Wilson, Black Codes of the South, 65.
discounts several historians’ assertions that the passage of Black Code was 
due solely to economic reasons. But whether the motives of Mississippians 
in passing the Black Code were economic; political, racial, or a combination of 
all three, responses from the North were nearly unanimous, and the hostile 
reactions sparked by Mississippi’ actions contributed to the rapid breakdown 
of presidential reconstruction.
Chapter Four: Reactions and Responses to the Black Code
Most white Mississippians were initially pleased with the actions of the 
state legislature. Mississippi newspapers either praised the legislation or 
remained uncharacteristically silent on the issue. The Friars Point 
Coaltontian commended the legislature: "The laws enacted on the all
absorbing negro question, are as good, we conceive, as could be framed at this 
time." Few editors questioned the wisdom of the Black Code or anticipated a 
negative Northern reaction. The editor of the Vicksburg journal confidently 
wrote:
Wo trust that the advocates of negro suffrage and equality are satisfied. The 
Legislature of Mississippi has provided freely and fully for the protection of 
the Freedman in his person and property -  and that these provisions will be* 
faithfully and conscientiously carried out, no sane man will doubt. We have 
met the issue presented us. in good faith, and in Mississippi today, the 
Freedman is as well protected as he is in any State in the Union
Ironically, the usually vocal Jackson Daily Clarion failed to comment on the 
Black Code.1
A few Mississippians, however, opposed the Black Code from its 
inception. A convention of freedmen in Vicksburg urged President Johnson 
to nullify the new state laws. They wrote, "it will be virtually returning us to
1 Friars Point Coahomian, Dec. 1, 1865; Vicksburg journal, Nov. 12, 1865, quoted in I larris, 
Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 143.
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slavery again. To this we will not submit in any form, and you may know 
what that means." Others begged Northern Congressmen to repeal the 
discriminatory laws. In late November, former slaveowner Robert Flournoy 
wrote radical Republican Thaddeus Stevens, a Congressman from 
Pennsylvania, that the President’s plan had ruined "whatever genuine 
Union sentiment was forming and would in time have grown up." He 
encouraged Stevens to "let these rebellious states know and feel that there is a 
power left that can reach and punish treason." These dissidents composed 
only a small minority, however, and despite Sharkey’s later claim to the 
Congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction that the Black Code never 
had the support of the states citizens, it appears that most white 
Mississippians did originally endorse the legislation.2
The early approval and confidence exhibited by white Mississippians, 
however, soon rapidly dissipated. The Black Code provoked responses of 
disbelief and outrage in the North. Radical Republican newspapers 
particularly attacked Die actions of the state legislature. The Chicago Tribune 
declared:
we tell the white men of Mississippi that the men of the North will convert 
the state of Mississippi into a frogpond before they will allow any such law to 
disgrace one foot of soil in which the bones of our soldiers sloop and over which 
the flag of freedom waves.
The more conservative New York Times also blasted the Mississippi Black 
Code. Referring to the Mississippi legislature, a Times correspondent wrote,
2ltarris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 144-45n, 146; Foner, Reconstruction, 226.
These men did a greater wrong than merely doing wrong. There can be no 
excuse for them, for they maliciously did wrong.
Not only did the Northern press express hostility to Mississippi’s Black 
Code, the first one passed by a Southern legislature, but several Northern 
editors also exaggerated the harsh provisions, making the laws appear more 
extreme than they actually were. For example, the New York Times 
announced:
The Cincinnati Commercial has a letter from a correspondent traveling through 
Mississippi, who states that the barbarous vagrant law recently passed by the 
Rebel State Legislature is rigidly enforced, and under its provisions the freed 
slaves are rapidly being re-enslaved. No negro is allowed to buy, rent, or lease 
real estate; all minors of any value are taken from thtir parents and bound out 
to planters; and every freed man who does not contract for a years labor is taken 
up as a vagrant.
Such inaccuracies appeared in many Northern newspapers. Because the 
Northern press rarely printed the actual laws, Northerners received only the 
interpreted versions which their newspapers provided. Therefore, with its 
already harsh features supplemented by Northern distortions, the Mississippi 
Black Code was attacked as an attempt to reinstate slavery under a new 
name.* 4
Even Northern Democrats, eager to restore their party’s prominence with 
the help of the ex-Confederates, were distressed by the Mississippi laws.
V hicago Tribune, Doc. 1,1865; Now York Times, Fob. 4, 1866.
4Now York Times, March I, 1866; Wilson, The Black Codes of the South, 117*18.
C ongressman S. S. Cox later wrote:
It is surprising that the intelligent men of Mississippi could have persuaded 
themselves, after the terrible experience through which they had passed, that 
the triumphant North, now thoroughly imbued with the anti-slavery 
sentiment, would fora moment tolerate this new slave code.
Mississippians first awakened to this reality when General O. O. Howard, the 
Commissioner of the Freed men’s Bureau, instructed Colonel Thomas to 
ignore the Black Code's discriminatory property restrictions. In addition, on 
December 5, the thirty-ninth United States Congress convened in 
Washington and refused to recognize the recently-elected Southern Senators 
and Representatives. When news of these events reached the state, the 
attitudes of the Mississippi press and legislators abruptly changed. Ih e  
Jackson Daily Clarion, previously silent on the issue, suddenly criticized the 
state legislature for "its insane proclivity to strain at gnats after having 
swallowed the camel.'' The editor blamed the Biack Code, which had 
'succeeded in fastening upon us indefinitely the negro bureau, placed us in 
imminent danger of another provisional government, and doubtless secured 
the rejection of our members in Congress." The Clarion now declared that 
the vagrant law was slavery "restored in far worse form than it was before,' 
because if a freedman was "unable to find a white man to hire him, ... |he| 
would be compelled to labor for nothing." Another newspaper called the 
state legislature:
(a) shallow-headed majority more anxious to make capital at home than to
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propitiate the powers at Washington. They are as complete a set of political 
G >ths as were ever turned loos.’ to work destruction upon a state. The fortunes of 
the whole South have been injured by their folly.^
Many prominent Mississippians, now fearing another year of federal 
military rule, suddenly regretted the passage of the Black Code, and several 
hoped that the legislature might reconvene "for the purpose of having the 
late hasty and impolitic Legislation repealed.” State senator William D. Lyles, 
a leader of the anti-testimony group, had reversed his opinions by late 
December. He wrote Governor Humphreys, "We can now begin to 
understand the defects of our recent legislation. If you do not think of calling 
us together for several months, I would be giad to know it, as I am thinking 
seriously of going to Mexico.” A former Confederate congressman was even 
more despondent. He told the Mississippi Governor, "I wish that Legislature 
had never assembled, or that you had closed their acts in mass and vetoed the 
whole concern.” In February 1866, Humphreys told the New York Time* 
that at least one-half of the legislators had written him letters detailing their 
constituents' discontent with the Black Code and their desire to call a 
convention to amend the laws. Governor Humphreys told the New York 
Times that he disapproved of the civil rights bill and only signed it because 
Sharkey told him that it was better than nothing. Sharkey, however, when 
testifying before the Congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 
declared that he always felt the property restrictions were unconstitutional.h
Y.arner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, I17n; Jackson Daily Clarion, Dec. 9, 1865, quoted in 
Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 144, 144n; Columbus Sentinel, quoted in 
Garner, Reconstruction in Mississippi, 116.
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But in spite of the statewide regret over the legislature's actions, white 
Mississippians had not suddenly converted to the doctrine of racial equality. 
They simply desired the states restoration in the Union. For example, one 
editor wrote, ”We do not propose to discuss the right or wrong attached to the 
laws, but what we do propose is to show that their repeal or modification is 
necessary if Mississippi would regain her position in the Union.” And a few 
editors continued to support the Black ( ’ode. the Natchez D em ocrat 
proclaimed, "We are not disposed to  lu u l fault with the members of our 
legislature. As pioneers they approximated wonderfully near to full justice to 
the negro.” Despite the appeals by the legislators, the press, and the public to 
repeal or amend the Black Code, Governor Humphreys refused to reconvene 
the legislature.* 7
Only a week after Mississippi enacted the first Black Code, the thirty-ninth 
Congress convened in Washington, D. C , and the focus of reconstruction 
shifted to the national level. For the first time since the end of the war nearly 
seven months earlier, the legislative branch of the federal government came 
into session. As Mississippians waited in earnest to see whether Congress 
would seat their recently elected Senators and Representatives, the 
Republican majority made two things clear: the President’s plan needed
modification, and Congress would play the leading role in effecting the 
necessary changes.
^Friars Point Coahomian, jan. 26, 1866; Harris, Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 
143-6; New York Times, Feb. 4, 1866.
7 Harri», Presidential Reconstruction in Mississippi, 145-6.
By prior arrangement with Republican leaders, the clerk of the House ol 
Representatives, Hdward McPherson, omitted the names of the Southern 
Representatives during the calling of the roll. Although lames Brooks, a 
New York Democrat, attempted to force the recognition of representatives 
from Tennessee and Virginia, Thaddeus Stevens, ’ through brisk 
parliamentary legerdemain,'' managed to avoid a prolonged debate, and the 
Southerners were excluded. After Indiana Republican Schuyler Colfax was 
re-elected Speaker of the House, Stevens then proposed the formation of a 
|oint Committee on Reconstruction, which would ’’inquire into the 
condition of the States which formed the so-called confederate States of 
America, and report whether they or any of them are entitled to be 
represented in either House of Congress.” The motion passed the House, 133- 
3h, and a week later the Senate concurred. On the first day of the session, the 
Republican majority had determined that changes in the President's program 
were needed and had affirmed the power of Congress to determine those 
changes.8
The early developments on Capitol Hill, however, did not indicate 
disapproval of President Johnson's policies. Most Republicans, except the 
radicals, continued to express their support for the President. But by the end 
of the Civil War, these moderates required more from the former 
Confederates than just the nullification of secession and the abolition of 
slavery. In addition to endorsing a free labor ideology, influential Republican 
leaders such as Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull and Speaker of the I louse
^Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st session (Washington, D. C , 1866), 1-6; McKitrick,
Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, 238-59.
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Colfax, by no means radicals, demanded that the freed men be granted basic 
civil rights. Despite the apparently minor differences, as long as the President 
cooperated, most Republicans believed that a speedy restoration of the 
Southern states would ensued
Cause for hope of a harmonious settlement seemed legitimate in early 
December. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction, for example, was 
tempered by moderates such as Senator William Pitt Fessenden, and Charles 
Sumner, the radical Senator from Massachusetts, despite his desires to chair 
the committee, was completely left off. In addition, efforts by radicals like 
Stevens and Timothy Howe of Wisconsin demanding political equality for 
the freed men failed miserably in both Houses. In his annual message to 
Congress, delivered on December 5, President Johnson was conciliatory. He 
indirectly criticized the Black Code when he declared, "it is equally clear that 
good faith requires the security of the freedmen in their liberty and in their 
property, their right to labor, and their right to claim the just return for their 
labor" And although he intimated that reconstruction had been completed 
by the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, he admitted that Congress 
possessed the right to judge the qualifications of its own members. At this 
point, conciliation seemed highly possible between the executive and 
legislative branches. Unfortunately, the period of cautious optimism rapidly 
dissipated.10
'Toner, Reconstruction, 22^-27, 242-44.
240; Johnson's message to Congress is located in Edward McPherson, The Political 
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The Mississippi Black Code was soon under siege by Republicans, both 
radical and conservative. According to Senator Henry Wilson of 
Massachusetts, ’the law of Mississippi makes every one of these men whom 
we have made free practically a slave, and he is in worse condition today than 
he was when he was a slave." jesse Fell, an influential Republican from 
Illinois, urged Congress "to adopt measures for the safety and elevation of the 
African race. Their present nominal freedom is nothing but a mockery." As 
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction gathered evidence of the cruelty and 
virtual re-enslavement of the freed men under the provisional governments, 
most Republican Congressmen greeted with skepticism President Johnson's 
claim that "measures have been adopted or are now pending, to confer upon 
the freedmen rights and privileged which are essential to their comfort, 
protection, and security." While Johnson seemed to be supporting the Black 
Codes, most Republicans endorsed the views espoused by the Springfield 
Republican, which declared that the protection of the freedmen’s basic rights 
"follows from the suppression of the rebellion. The party is nothing, if it does 
not do this -  the nation is dishonored if it hesitate in this." As Christmas 
approached, signs of a break with the President over the freedmen existed, but 
the course of Reconstruction still remained undetermined,1 1
When Congress reconvened on January 5 after a brief holiday, the 
influential Trumbull introduced two bills which embodied the policy of the 
Republican party. Both proposals were designed to curb "local legislation or a 
prevailing public sentiment in some of the States [in which! persons of the
1’‘Com#- Globe, 39th Cong., 1st scss., 39-41; Mark M. Krug, Lyman Trumbull: Conservative
Radical (New York, 1965), 236; McPherson, A Political History of the United States ..., 66-67; 
loner, Reconstruction, 251.
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African race ... continue to be oppressed and in fact deprived of their 
freedom.” When proposing the two bills, the Illinois Senator referred to the 
Black Codes passed by Mississippi and South Carolina, and declared, The 
purpose of the bill[s) is to destroy all these discriminations.”12 *
The first proposal, known as the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, intended to 
extend indefinitely the life of the Freedmen’s Bureau and provide land, 
education, and general relief for indigent freedmen. In addition, Bureau 
agents were authorized to take jurisdiction over any cases in which Southern 
state officials denied freedmen the "civil rights belonging to white persons. 
The bill easily passed both Houses. ^
The second proposal, called the Civil Rights Bill, marked the first attempt 
by the federal government to define citizenship. Under this act,
all persons born in the United States ... are hereby declared to be citizens of the 
United States; and such citizens of every race and color, without regard to any 
previous condition of slavery ... shall have the same right in every State ... to 
make and enforce contracts; to sue, be parties, and give evidence; to inherit, 
purchase, lean', sell, hold, and convey real und personal property; and to full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property as is enjoyed by white citizens.
Any violation of a freedman's civil rights was considered a misdemeanor 
under the jurisdiction of federal district courts. The Civil Rights Bill also 
passed both Houses with ease.14
12C(Wtf. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 77, 474.
I\lcPherson, A Political History of the United States ..., 72-74. The Freedmen’s Bureau Bill
was passed in the Senate, 37-10, and in the House, 137-33.
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When the House approved the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill on February 6, 
most Republicans felt confident that President Johnson would sign the 
measure. In late January, Fessenden had given a speech defending the bill, 
lie dismissed the rumors of a breach with the President and guaranteed 
Johnson s support of Congress. Trumbull, who had met with the President 
several times to discuss both bills, also believed the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill 
had the support of the chief executive. The President, however, had other 
aims.15
President Johnson had been looking for an opening by which he could 
isolate the radicals in Congress and thereby form a new Union Party with 
himself as its leader. Because he found the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill 
unconstitutional, the President saw a perfect opportunity. In early February, 
Senator-elect Sharkey had met with the President and assured him that ’’by 
taking the initiative you make no issue with any party, but simply discharge a 
duty required by law. If Congress should not sustain you, it is that body that 
makes the issue with you, not you with them.” Apparently heeding 
Sharkey s advice, on Monday, February 19, the President vetoed the bill. The 
President saw no need for the extension. The act would cost the government 
too much money, and it would damage the freedmen's chances to become 
independent. In addition, the military tribunals would be an invasion of 
civil judicial proceedings.16
I tybiii, 78*80. The Civil Rights Bill was passed in the Senate, 33-12, and in the House, l l l -  
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Republicans were astonished. Because he refused to address the Black 
Codes in his veto, the President implied his approval of these discriminatory 
laws. A Chicago Republican editorial indicated most Republicans’ dismay:
The President refuse's to give his consent to a measure so just and necessary. He 
will give the luckless freed men, no matter though they may have borne arms 
and suffered wounds for the nation, no other protection than that of the 
ferocious clutches from which they have just been snatched. They shall have 
no safeguard, no law, no administration of justice, except such as the Rebel 
States will afford them.
Replying to the President’s veto, Trumbull declared, "I believe [the freedmen] 
will be tyrannized over, abused, and virtually reenslaved without some 
legislation by the nation for his protection."* 17
Despite the fact that the Freedmens Bureau Bill was passed by a two-thirds 
majority in both Houses, the President was convinced that it was the work of 
a radical cabal led by Stevens and Sumner. He hoped the veto would expel 
the radicals from political favor, and the moderates and conservative 
Republicans would unite and join with him. What the President failed to 
realize was that the idea of civil rights for the freedmen was not a radical 
notion. By early 1866, it was an important aspect of mainstream Republican 
party ideology. If the President had united with Congress on granting the 
freedmen their civil rights, conflict could have been avoided, and the radicals 
might have been ostracized on the idea of black suffrage. Instead, Johnson
Political History of the United States .... 76*78.
l7McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, 289, 292.
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chose to fight the party that elected him on a more moderate issue, a battle 
which proved impossible to win.18
Because the President was still popular at the time, the attempt to override 
the veto in the Senate failed by five votes. Republicans, however, began 
mobilizing to assure that future bills would not suffer the same fate. 
Amazingly, Republicans felt that reconciliation with Johnson was still a 
possibility, and most Congressional delegates felt that the President would 
surely sign the Civil Rights Bill. On March 24, however, Johnson vetoed the 
measure. To nearly all Republicans, any hope for cooperation with the 
President had died. Both Houses promptly overrode the veto, and with the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act in April 1866, the Mississippi Black Code had 
been nullified. Presidential Reconstruction was essentially over.
G erm an , Reunion Without Compromise, 189.
Epilogue
The airy gentlemen who think that half a nation can be alienated Irom the 
other half for forty years, and after appealing to a tremendous civil war, 
which rages for four years, tearing up the industrial and political system of 
half a continent by its roots, and after one part is vanquished in the field ... can 
conjure a settlement and reunion in a few weeks or months by a free use of the 
word conciliation,” will have an opportunity of learning wisdom from events.
This was the advice given by Harper's Weekly in February of 1866, and in 
hindsight it remains true. After four years of bloody war, there was no way 
that the lenient terms of Presidential Reconstruction would have appeased 
the North and the Republican Congress. Just the same, probably no attempt 
by Congress to claim the fruits of the victory could have changed abruptly the 
attitudes of Southerners, whose entire society was based upon slavery, and in 
the absence of that, the assumption of Negro inferiority. Looking back, it 
seems highly unlikely that Reconstruction on the state leve. could have 
turned out differently.1
To Mississippians, the Black Code was an honest attempt to solve the 
economic and social problems created by emancipation. Fearing that the 
freedmen would refuse to work unless compelled to do so, the Mississippi 
legislature sought to harness the labor the state so desperately needed by 
forcing the freedmen back to the plantations of their former owners. Most 
legislators had no desire to return the freedmen to slavery, as some
1 Harper's Weekly, Feb. 10, 1866, quo tod in Wilson, The Black Code of the Sot4th, 148.
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Northerners contended, but they did desire to keep the black population from 
"becoming a permanent burden upon the state treasury." The contract and 
vagrancy laws were an attempt to prevent this malady. It must also be noted 
that Mississippi’s Black Code was passed in a time of economic crisis. The 
freedmen, uncertain of their new position in Southern society, were reluctant 
to contract as laborers for the coming year, 1866. In addition, many blacks 
were convinced that the federal government intended to distribute "forty 
acres and a mule" to them, and they were excited at the chance to become 
landowners. In an effort to urge the freedmen to work, and under fears that 
freedmen across the state were planning an insurrection, Mississippians 
responded with the Black Code.
Despite its severity and the hostile response it received in the North, the 
Black Code, was not enacted without an acknowledgement of Northern 
attitudes. In fact, many elements of the Black Code, including the contract 
laws, had been approved by the Union army and the Freedmen's Bureau. 
Most important of all, white Mississippians thought that their actions were 
sanctioned by the highest officer in the United States: the President himself. 
In the absence of Congress at the war's end, it was the President's duty to 
apply early terms for reconstruction and to guarantee that those terms were 
being met.
From Johnson's early Reconstruction proclamations until the convening 
of Congress in December of 1865, Mississippians relied solely on the chief 
executive when attempting to rebuild their shattered society. When asked by 
whose authority that Reconstruction would proceed, President Johnson 
replied, "It shall proceed by my authority, and mine alone." And at one
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point, the President told the Southerners:
There may be speeches published from various quarters, that may breathe a 
different spirit. Do not let them trouble or excite you, but believe that it is ... 
the great object of the Government to make the union of these United States 
more complete and perfect than ever ...
In essence, Johnson was telling Mississippians to ignore the warnings in the 
Northern press that the South must accept gracefully the results of the Civil 
War. When the North refused to seat the Southern Congressmen in 
December, 1865, the President must bear a great deal of the responsibility.2
Not only did the Black Code arouse suspicion and hostility in the North 
and further discredit the President's plan, but the President himself chose to 
fight Congress on the basis of these laws. Both the Freedmen's Bureau Bill 
and the Civil Rights Bill, introduced and approved by the most conservative 
Republicans, represented attempts to invalidate the Black Code and to 
guarantee federal protection of the civil rights of the freedmen. But Johnson/ 
in spite of the fact that both bills passed by large majorities in both Houses, 
vetoed the legislation. When Congress overrode the veto of the Civil Rights 
Bill in April of 1866, Johnson's break with Congress was permanently sealed. 
Congressional Reconstruction ensued. It was thus the Black Codes which 
caused the breach in the federal government and determined the path that 
Reconstruction would follow. The enduring legacy of the Black Code was 
established in 1867, when Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment,
2McKitrick, Andrew johnson and Reconstruction, 189-90.
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which made the Civil Rights Act a permanent part of the Constitution. It is a 
testament to the confusing and chaotic years of Reconstruction that the 
Fourteenth Amendment continues to be interpreted and enfjrced in various 
ways today.
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